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STATE AND LOCAL ADVISORY REPORTS ON
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT LABOR LEGISLATION:
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
Russell A. Smith*
years have witnessed a tendency on the part of state and
local governmental authorities, executive and legislative, to
establish advisory groups to make recommendations concerning
public employment labor relations legislation.1 In addition, the
National Governors' Conference in 1966 created a "Task Force on
State and Local Government Labor Relations" which, with the
support of a grant from the Carnegie Foundation, made a study of
labor relations policy in the public sector. In 1967, this group made
its report, which contained a significant set of "findings" by an ad
hoc Advisory Committee.2 These reports are tangible evidence of an
increasing realization by public officials and the general populace
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1. President Kennedy established a precedent for the advisory-group approach at
the state level by his appointment in 1961 of a "President's Task Force on EmployeeManagement Relations in the Federal Service." This group was headed by then
Secretary of Labor Arthur Goldberg. The Report, sometimes referred to as the "Goldberg Task Force Report," was implemented in 1962 by Executive Order 10,988 [3 C.F.R.
521 (1959-1963 compilation)] which, for the first time, established as a general policy
at the federal level, rights of unionization and collective bargaining for employees of
most federal agencies. The executive order provided for several varieties of "recognition," including exclusive representation in appropriate units under certain circumstances. It required federal agencies to engage in collective bargaining with organizations having exclusive bargaining rights, and to grant other forms of "recognition" to
organizations not having such rights. The executive order denied a right of recognition to any organization asserting the right of federal employees to strike, and it
excluded certain managerial areas from the scope of collective bargaining. The order
left bargaining unit determination within the control of the employing agency.
Specific sanctions for violation of the obligations imposed on the agencies were not
stipulated, nor was any tribunal given authority to enforce such obligations. The Civil
Service Commission, however, was charged with the development of "a program to
assist in carrying out the objectives" of the order. In so doing, it has issued in the
form of guidelines, "Standards of Conduct for Employees Organizations and Code of
Fair Labor Practices."
2. Report of the Task Force on State and Local Government Labor Relations.
(This Report was published by the Public Personnel Association, which has granted
permission for quotations that appear in this Article.) Governor Smith, of West
Virginia, noted in his Letter of Transmittal to the National Governors' Conference
that the Task Force study had a fourfold mission:
I. To provide information essential to the formulation of a sound philosophy on
many facets of government-employee relations.
2. To furnish a frame of reference for the consideration of legislative and admininstrative measures.
3. To identify critical issues and policies, alternative ways of handling them, and to
assess their impact on the public service.
4. To draw on the relevant private sector experience in a public sector setting.
There bas since been issued a 1968 supplement to the Task Force Report (also published by the Public Personnel Association).
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that public employee "unionism," with its attendant problems, has
emerged as the most significant development in American labor rela•
tions in the last decade.
The reasons for public concern are obvious. First, there has been
a rapid increase in the proportion of the total work force employed
by various levels of government.3 Unionism in the private sector has
apparently reached a plateau both in terms of the level of manage•
ment-employee involvement and in conceptualization of underlying
dispute settlement philosophies, procedures, and legal structures. In
marked contrast, the public sector has become the focus of increasingly successful organizational efforts by unions and certain professional associations seeking collective bargaining rights on behalf of
public employees-teachers, policemen, fire fighters, sanitation workers, transit workers, and others. At the same time, public policywith certain notable exceptions emerging only in recent years-has
been essentially adverse to attempts at unionization and collective
bargaining in the public sphere.4
A large number of states and some municipalities have repudiated
past policies adverse to self-organization in the public sector by
enacting legislation granting rights of unionization and collective
bargaining to public employees,5 but the traditional prohibition
against strikes by public employees remains unchanged. Yet, as anyone who reads the newspapers knows, public employees have been
increasingly prepared to resort to strikes in open defiance of the law.
This is true even in the case of policemen and firefighters-employees whose services are regarded as essential to the community.
Thus, the grant of organizational and bargaining rights to public
3. Stieber, Collective Bargaining in the Public Sector, in THE AMERICAN AssEMBLY,
CHALLENGES TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 65 (1965).
4. See generally Smith &: Clark, Reappraisal of the Role of the States in Shaping
Labor Relations Law, 1965 WIS. L. REv. 411, 421-25; Stieber, supra note 3.
5. CALIF. GoVT. CODE §§ 3500-11 (West Supp. 1968) (excluding school district em•
ployees); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-467 to -478 (Supp. 1969) (municipal employees);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-153b to d (Supp. 1969), § I0-153f (1967) (teachers and
school superintendants); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1301-13 (Supp. 1966); MASS. ANN.
LAws ch. 149, §§ 178G-N (Supp. 1967) (municipal employees); MASs. ANN. LAws. ch. 149,
§ 178F (Supp. 1968) (state employees); MxcH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §§ 423.201-.216 (1967)
("Hutchinson Act'); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 179.50-.58 (1966); Mo. R.Ev. STAT. §§ 105.500.530 (Supp. 1968); N.Y. Cxv. SERv. LAw, §§ 200-12 (McKinney Supp. 1968) ("Taylor
Law') [The present version of this law, as amended by a bill passed on March 4, 1969
(effective April 1, 1969), appears in Government Employee Relations Report, No. 288,
at F-1 (March 17, 1969).]; ORE. R.Ev. STAT. §§ 243.710-.780 (1967); R. I. GEN. LAws
§§ 28-9.1 to -14 (1969) (Fire Fighters); R. I. GEN. LAws §§ 28-9.2-1 to -14 (1969) (policemen); R. I. GEN. LAWS §§ 28-9.3-1 to -16 (1969) (teachers); R. I. GEN. LAws §§ 28-9.4-1
to -19 (1969) (municipal employees); R. I. GEN. LAws §§ 36-11-1 to -6 (Supp. 1967)
(state employees); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1701-05 (Supp. 1968) (municipal employees);
WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 111-70(1) to (5) (Supp. 1969) (municipal employees); WIS. STAT, ANN.
§§ 111.80-.94 (Supp. 1969) (state employees); WASH. R.Ev. CODE ANN. tit. 41.56 (Supp.
1967).
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employees has left unresolved many important legal and social issues,
including-some would argue 6-the very premises underlying the
modem legislation. Also unresolved are problems of accommodating
public employee collective bargaining (with or without a legal right
to strike) with serious public concern over the subject areas and
impact of that bargaining.
In this context, the reports of the various advisory groups may
appropriately be regarded as an important body of opinion concerning public sector unionization. This, I assume, is why the editors
of the Michigan Law Review concluded that a discussion of them
should be included in this Symposium. Instead of focusing on two
or three of the more recent and highly publicized reports, I will
discuss most of them, recognizing that space limitations necessarily
preclude a comprehensive treatment of each.
The reports surveyed in this Article will be designated by reference to the state or other governmental unit with which each is associated. The reports are, in chronological order, the Connecticut
Report of February 1965,7 the Minnesota Report of March 1965,8 the
Rhode Island Report of February 1966,9 the New York ("Taylor
Committee") Report of March 1966,10 the Michigan Report of
6. See generally Kheel, Strikes and Public Employment, 67 MICH, L. REv. 93 (1969).
7. Report of the Interim Commission To Study Collective Bargaining by Municipalities. This report was issued by an eleven-member commission established by Public
Act No. 495 of the 1963 Connecticut General Assembly. The Commission, composed of
municipal officials, employer organization officials, state legislators, and academicians,
was chaired by Professor Robert Stutz of the University of Connecticut.
8. Report of the Governor's Committee on Public Employee Labor Relations Laws.
The Committee was appointed by Governor Carl F. Rolvaag and consisted of representatives of labor, public employer management, and the academic community. Its
chairman was Judge William D. Gunn of the Minnesota District Court.
9. This was a report of a Commission To Study Mediation and Arbitration created
by the Rhode Island General Assembly. The Commission consisted of four members
from the house of representatives, three from the senate, and four from the "public,''
appointed by the Governor. The Report resulted in the enactment of the Rhode
Island Teachers Arbitration Act. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 28-9.3-1 (1968).
10. Governor's Committee on Public Employee Relations, State of New York, Final
Report, March 31, 1966. Excerpts of the report are reproduced in GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT [hereinafter GERR] No. 135, at D-1 to D-2 (April II, 1966).
The Governor's Committee also submitted two subsequent reports, a first Interim Report on June 17, 1968, and a second Interim Report on Jan. 23, 1969. The "Governor's
Committee on Public Employee Relations" was appointed by Governor Nelson Rockefeller. The members of the Committee were George W. Taylor, Chairman, E. Wight
Bakke, David L. Cole, John T. Dunlop, and Frederick H. Harbison-all well-known
labor relations experts.
Mention should also be made of the Report of the New York City Tripartite Panel
To Improve Collective Bargaining Procedures (1966). This Panel was appointed by
Mayor 'Wagner, and its report formed the basis for the establishment, by charter, of the
Office of Collective Bargaining. This agency has jurisdiction to decide representation
questions, provide mediation services, appoint collective bargaining "impasse panels,''
and provide for grievance arbitration. The report also served as the basis for the
enactment of the New York City Collective Bargaining Law (Administrative Code,
ch. 54, Local Law 53-1967), and the issuance in September 1967 of Executive Order
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February 1967,11 the Illinois Report of March 1967,12 the New Jersey
Report of January 1968,13 the Pennsylvania Report of June 1968,14
and the Los Angeles County Report of July 1968.15 The "findings"
made by the National Governors' Conference Task Force Report
will not be included in this survey, but this omission carries no
invidious connotation. The Task Force Report is required reading
for anyone interested in public employment relations because it
contains, in addition to a general bibliography, an excellent analysis
of the problems presented by publJc sector unionism and much
valuable factual documentation of existing laws.
I.

PURPOSE AND IMPACT OF THE REPORTS:

AN

OVER-ALL APPRAISAL

The task assigned to most of the advisory groups by their respective governmental units was very broad: What kind of a statutory
policy on public employee unionism should the particular jurisdiction adopt? There was no legislation granting rights of unionization
to public employees in Connecticut, Minnesota, New York, Illinois,
or Los Angeles County prior to the appointment of the advisory
committees. In New York, the legislation in effect at the time of the
report-the Condon-Wadlin Law16-simply prohibited strike action
under threat of repressive penalties. Thus, Condon-Wadlin not only
provided for automatic dismissal of any striking employee, but also
specified that should he subsequently be rehired, he would be ineligible for higher pay until three years after the strike. Moreover, he
No. 52. Under these provisions, rights of unionization and collective bargaining are
conferred on employees of City agencies other than the Board of Education.
11. A Governor's Advisory Committee on Public Employee Relations was appointed
by Governor George Romney in July 1966. The members of the Committee were the
author (as chairman), Gabriel N. Alexander, Edward L. Cushman, Ronald W. Haugh•
ton, and Charles C. Killingsworth.
12. The Governor's Advisory Commission on Labor-Management Policy for Public
Employees was appointed by Governor Otto Kerner, and included representatives from
labor, management, the state legislature, and universities. Professors Martin 'Wagner
and Milton Derber of the University of Illinois served as Chairman and Vice Chairman,
respectively.
13. The New Jersey Public and School Employees' Grievance Procedures Study
Commission was established pursuant to a mandate of the New Jersey legislature. The
Commission consisted of twelve members, two from the senate, two from the assembly,
and eight appointed by the Governor. The Chairman was Marver H. Bernstein.
14. The Governor's Commission To Revise the Public Employee Law of Pennsylvania was appointed by Governor Raymond P. Shafer. The Commission consisted of
Chairman Leon E. Hickman, eight "citizen members," and two members of the
legislature.
15. A Consultants' Committee was appointed by the Board of Supervisors of Los
Angeles County to recommend an employee relations ordinance for Los Angeles
County. The Committee consisted of Benjamin Aaron, Chairman, Lloyd H. Bailer, and
Howard Block.
16. Law of March 27, 1947, ch. 391, [1947] N.Y. Laws 842, as amended, Law of
April 23, 1963, ch. 702, [1963) N.Y. Laws 2432 (repealed 1967).
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was to remain on "probation" for five years. Since none of the existing laws had proved effective in preventing strikes, the problem in
each jurisdiction was to start afresh and frame a new kind of policy.
By the time the Michigan Advisory Committee was created,
Michigan had already adopted its 1965 Public Employment Relations Act, 17 which granted rights of unionization to public employees
and reversed an earlier negative policy similar to that of New Yark.
The Michigan Committee, established in the context of an anticipated school strike emergency in the fall of 1965, was requested to
reassess the basic policies reflected in the 1965 Act and to determine
whether there were any serious deficiencies in that law which should
be corrected immediately.18 The recommendations of the Michigan
group have yet to receive legislative approval, although there has
been strong support for some of the proposals.
The New York Report contains the best in-depth analysis of the
unique characteristics of state and local public employment relations
bearing upon the question whether and within what limits public
policy should accord rights of unionization and collective bargaining
to public employees. The Illinois Report (influenced, I suspect, considerably by the work of the Taylor Committee) also deserves special
commendation for its treatment of the relevant policy issues. This
report was the more remarkable because, despite the tripartite composition of the Governor's Advisory Commission, it achieved substantial unanimity in its conclusions. Although the recommendations of the Illinois Commission reached the state legislature, they
foundered there in part because of disagreement within the ranks
of labor.19
The Connecticut, Illinois, and Los Angeles reports contain the
most complete treatment of the details of proposed legislation.
Indeed, the Connecticut and Los Angeles reports respectively incorporated a draft statute and ordinance which in all essentials
17. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.201-.216 (1967). For a discussion of the 1965 Act,
see Howlett, Michigan's New Public Employment Relations Act, 45 MICH. ST. B.J. 12
(1966); GERR No. 206, at E-1 (Aug. 21, 1967), which contains the text of the
speech, "Michigan's Experience with Public Employee Bargaining,'' delivered by
Robert G. Howlett, Chairman of the Michigan Labor Mediation Board, to the Annual Convention of State Labor Relations Agencies.
18. See GERR No. 181, at F-7 (Feb. 27, 1967).
19. Most unions favored some form of legislation similar to that recommended by
the Commission. However, they disagreed vehemently among themselves over the strike
issue: some groups, including the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees, were willing to accept a "no-strike" provision in order to obtain rights
of self-organization and collective bargaining; other groups refused to accept any
legislation which contained a ban on strikes. See Derber, Labor-Management Policy
for Public Employees in Illinois: The Experience of the Governor's Commission, 21
!Nous. &: LAB. REL. Rlw. 541, 552 (1968); GERR No. 199, at B-4 Guly 3, 1967); GERR
No. 212, at B-13 (Oct. 2, 1967).

896

Michigan Law Review

(Vol, 67:891

subsequently became law in those jurisdictions.20 Measured in terms
of legislative response, these reports, together with the Minnesota,
New Jersey, and Rhode Island reports, were the most successful.
The New York Report also engendered an important legislative response, although the Committee's basic recommendations, as modified, did not receive legislative approval until the second legislative
session after the Report was issued.21 The Pennsylvania Report, on
the other hand, seems doomed, at least for the present, to remain
part of the archives. Governor Shafer has indicated his outright
rejection of the Report's basic approach on the strike issue and has
proposed his own set of alternatives. 22
II. ARE.As

OF GENERAL CONSENSUS

The advisory groups appear to be in general accord on certain
matters of fact and on at least some basic principles which should be
accepted as public policy. First, they agreed that there are certain
salient differences between private and public employment relations
which will necessarily affect the characteristics of collective bargaining in the public sector. One result of this is that three decades of
experience with governmental regulation of private labor relations
may not be directly applicable to the settlement of disputes in the
public sector. Second, panels agreed that, despite such differences,
public policy should accord to public employees rights of self-organization and unionization similar to those accorded in the private
sector-including some form of collective bargaining. Public employees should also enjoy the same freedom of choice which private
sector employees have under the Taft-Hartley Act to refrain from
unionization if they so desire.23
The reports generally recommended that appropriate legislation
be broad enough in scope to cover all or most categories of governmental employees. Thus, under most proposals, the range of coverage
would include blue-collar as well as white-collar workers, public
school teachers, police and fire fighters, and, in some instances, even
supervisory employees. The Michigan Committee, however, had to
take into account an existing constitutional provision which probably has the effect of making those employees of the state government
who are subject to the jurisdiction of the constitutionally created
20. CONN. GEN. STAT. R.Ev. §§ 7-467 to 27-475 (1965); Los ANGELES COUNTY ORD.
No. 9,646 (1968).
21. N.Y. Crv. SERV. LAw §§ 200-12 (McKinzey Supp. 1968), amending ch. 790, art.
VII, tit. C, § 108, [1958] N.Y. Laws, N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 751 (1948).
22. See GERR No. 252 (July 8, 1968). See GERR No. 267, at E-1 (Oct. 21, 1968), for
the alternative proposal by Governor Shafer.
23. Taft-Hartley Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
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Civil Service Commission exempt from any labor relations legislation.2~ Although the Committee acknowledged this situation, it
recommended that the Civil Service Commission, in its own discretion, adopt the substance of official state policy on rights of public
employee unionization and collective bargaining.25
The advisory groups agreed that public sector labor legislation
should include a prescribed set of public employer obligations
toward employees and employee unions modeled after the code of
employer unfair labor practices in the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA). 20 In addition, the panels usually proposed that a set of
complementary obligations be imposed on labor organizations and
employees. Here, however, the NLRA model was only partially followed. Thus, the groups typically recommended that coercive measures to impose unionization upon employees or attempts to induce
public employers to impose such constraints should be prohibited.
Moreover, in the event an organization acquires bargaining rights,
there should be a requirement of good faith collective bargaining
with the employing agency. But, the advisory panels seem to have
evidenced little concern with the other kinds of union "unfair labor
practices" specified by the NLRA-secondary boycotts, organizational and recognitional picketing, and strikes in support of jurisdictional disputes. The explanation for this is not clear. If we are to
continue a "no-strike" policy in the public sector, it would seem that
other kinds of concerted coercive action in support of collective bargaining demands should also be prohibited. Organizational and
recognitional picketing and strikes in support of jurisdictional disputes could present the same kinds of problems in the public sector
as they do in the private sector.
It was generally agreed that public sector labor legislation should
embrace the principle of exclusive recognition of the union or organization selected by the majority of employees in a defined bargaining unit. Here again, the NLRA obviously had its influence on the
advisory panels.27 The New York and Los Angeles reports, however,
24. The Public Employment Relations Act purports to be a broad exercise of
jurisdiction. With respect to state employees, it provides: "The provisions of this Act
as to state employees within the jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission shall be
deemed to apply insofar as the power exists in the Legislature to control employment
by the state or the emoluments thereof." MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.204a (1967).
However, the Michigan Constitution provides: "The legislature may enact laws providing for the resolution of disputes concerning public employees, except those in the
State classified Civil Service." MICH. CoNST. art. IV, § 48.
25. GERR No. 181, at F·2, F-6 to F-7.
26. NLRA § 8(a), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1964).
27. The principle of "exclusive recognition" is incorporated in section 9 of the
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1964), along with criteria of a general nature followed by
the National Labor Relations Board in defining an "appropriate bargaining unit."

898

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 67:891

indicated a somewhat different and more cautious approach than the
NLRA in handling "representation" matters. 28
With the exception of the Pennsylvania Report, which would
permit strikes in certain circumstances, all the reports agreed that
legislation on public sector employment relations should continue
the "no-strike" policy traditionally applicable to public employees.20
As will be noted, however, the groups differed on the rigorousness of
the sanctions which should be applied to vindicate this policy.30
All the reports emphasized the necessity of devising effective
dispute settlement procedures to take the place of strikes. Although
it was generally recognized that the government has a responsibility
to provide more than mediation services, the proposals for intervention beyond mediation showed little originality. The formula
usually suggested was "fact-finding" with accompanying public
recommendations. Compulsory arbitration was rejected31 except in
the Michigan32 and Rhode Island reports, in which it was recommended on a limited basis only. None of the reports displayed the
kind of ingenuity (some would say disingenuousness) to be found in
the recently enacted Canadian national legislation,33 recommended by
an advisory commission.34

III. AREAS OF DISAGREEMENT ON SUBSTANCE OR APPROACH

A. Administration and Enforcement
While there was general agreement that the resolution of representation issues and the enforcement of the unfair labor practice pro28. The New York recommendation was merely for further study. N.Y. Report 2930. The Los Angeles recommendation was for recognition of only one organization,
that which represents a majority. Such representation would not be exclusive. L.A.
Report 23.
29. See pt. 111.D.l. infra.
30. See pt. 111.D.2. infra.
31. See pt. 111.E. infra.
32. GERR No. 181, at F-3.
33. The Public Service Staff Relations Act was enacted in February 1967, c. 72,
[1966-67] Can. Stat. This legislation, which applies only at the national level, grew
in large part out of the work of a Preparatory Committee on Collective Bargaining
in the Federal Civil Service established in 1963. The statute contains a number of very
interesting features, the most significant of which from the American point of view, is
the provision permitting a labor organization to "opt" either for a strike or for
arbitration in connection with contract-term collective bargaining. The option has to
be taken in advance of a collective bargaining period and can be revised annually.
Certain subject matters are excluded from the arbitration process, and employees whose
duties are deemed by the parties or the government to be "necessary in the interest
of the safety or security of the public" are forbidden to engage in a strike.
34. For a comparison of the Canadian Public Service Staff Relations Act to the United
States Executive Order No. 10,988, 3 C.F.R. 521 (1959-1963 Compilation), see the report
of the Canada-United States Conference on Labor Relations in GERR No. 273, at A-2
(Dec. 2, 1968); see also Arthurs, Public Interest Disputes in Canada: A Legislative
Perspective, 17 BUFFALO L. R.Ev. 39 (1967); Arthurs, Collective Bargaining in the Public Service of Canada: Bold Experiment or Act of Folly?, 67 Mrca L. R.Ev. 971 (1969).
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hibitions should be handled by an administrative agency, the reports
differed on whether a single agency should administer both the
private sector law and the public sector law. The Connecticut panel
recommended that the same agency which administers the state's
private sector labor legislation should also be given jurisdiction over
public employment labor relations.35 In Michigan, the 1965 Act had
already vested jurisdiction over public employment relations in the
State Labor Mediation Board36-the same agency which administers
the private sector legislation. The Michigan Committee, although
listing the question of separate administration as a matter deserving
further study, was not convinced that separation of administration
was of such importance that it should be given immediate consideration.37
The Taylor Committee contemplated administration of the proposed public sector legislation by a new agency-the Public Employment Relations Board-independent of the tribunal which administers New York's private sector labor law; 38 this recommendation was
ultimately embodied in New York's so-called Taylor Law.39 The
New York Report did not indicate the rationale behind its proposal
for separate administration. The clear implication, however, is that
since novel approaches may be required to deal with the unique
problems of unionism in the public sector, the necessary expertise
should be permitted to develop unhampered by any preconceptions
associated with the administration of private sector legislation. Presumably, there is merit in this approach, although budgetary and
other practical political constraints may dictate the solution in particular states. The New Jersey Commission's approach, for instance,
had some unique aspects. Its position represented an amalgam drawn
from the experience of other states and from practical considerations
deemed appropriate to New Jersey. The Commission believed "that
the experience of the private sector in dispute settlements should be
applied to public employment when it is relevant and that functions
of administration and enforcement that are pertinent only to public
employment should be organized separately."40 It therefore recommended the creation of a single govern.mental agency charged with
the responsibility for invoking a variety of dispute settlement procedures short of compulsory arbitration in both the public and
35. GERR No. 81, at D-4 (March 29, 1965).
36. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.207 (1967).
37. GERR. No. 181, at F-12 (app.).
38. N.Y. Report 22.
39. N.Y. Crv. SERV. LAW §§ 200-12 (McKinney Supp. 1968). [The present version of
this law, as amended by a bill passed on March 4, 1969 (effective April 1, 1969), appears
in GERR, No. 288, at F-1 (March 17, 1969).]
40. GERR No. 229, at D-7 Gan. 29, 1968).
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private sectors. It proposed a separate agency to deal with problems
of representation and unfair practices in the public sector.41
Another procedural problem is whether, following the model of
the NLRA, 42 the agency charged with administering the public
sector legislation should have both prosecutorial and adjudicatory
functions. The Connecticut Report suggests that the appropriate
administrative agency should have both functions. 48 However, in
practice, the burden is on the complainant to prosecute his claim
before the agency.44 The New York and Los Angeles Reports are
unclear on this point,45 and the implementing legislation in both
jurisdictions is also somewhat ambiguous.46 In practice, the New
York Public Employment Relations Board appears to follow closely
the model of the NLRA: the Board's counsel can file charges and
act as the prosecuting agent before the Board for both strike charges
and claims of employer reprisals. In the case of Los Angeles, it was
apparently contemplated that the ultimate decision should be left
to the discretion of the Employee Relations Commission itself.47 The
Commission has not yet adopted formal rules defining whether it will
undertake a prosecutorial role in addition to its adjudicatory function, but it is clear that the Commission does have an important
investigatory responsibility. 48 The Illinois Report, on the other hand,
stated categorically that the proposed Illinois Public Relations Board
should have no investigatory or prosecutorial functions in unfair
practice cases and that each complainant should be responsible for
prosecuting his own claim.49 The rationale was that it would be
unwise to combine in any single agency both the functions of "prose41. The resulting New Jersey statute did not fully implement these recommendations. See New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:13A-l
to -11 (Supp. 1968), amending N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:13A-l to -13 (1959).
42. Under the NLRA, all investigative and prosecutorial functions are lodged with
the Office of the General Counsel, which exercises final authority on behalf of the
NLRB in this area. NLRA § 3(d), 29 U.S.C. § 153(d) (1964). This approach could
certainly be followed under state legislation on public employee unionism, provided
public interest in the vindication of the statutory policies is sufficiently strong to
justify the assumption of a public prosecutorial function. Such mundane considerations as costs in relation to the total work load of the agency could be determinative
of this question in some jurisdictions. Assuming the prosecutorial function is invested in a public agency, a further question is whether the "prosecutor," upon filing
a charge, should have exclusive jurisdiction over the matter from that point on. This
question is not answered in any of the reports.
43. GERR, No. 81, at D-1.
44. Telephone interview with John A. Gaspic, agent of the state labor relations
board in Hartford, Conn., Feb. 25, 1969.
45. See N.Y. Report 36; L.A. Report 31-32.
46. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAw § 205(5) (McKinney Supp. 1968); L.A. COUNTY ORD. No.
9,646, § 7(g) (1968).
47. Telephone interview with Lloyd H. Bailer, Chairman of the Los Angeles Employee Relations Comm., Feb. 26, 1969.
48. Id.
49. GERR No. 184, at D-11 (March 20, 1967).
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cutor and judge."50 The Michigan State Labor Mediation· Board,
although apparently empowered under the 1965 Act to establish a
prosecutorial arm, 51 has not yet done so. The Michigan Committee,
however, did not regard this as a priority item.
The reports typically assumed that the appropriate administra•
tive tribunal would have discretion, supported upon review by the
courts, to impose sanctions for substantive violations of the governing
law on public employee unionism. Again, the procedures followed
under the NLRA undoubtedly provided the model.52 The Los
Angeles group's recommendations, however, were unique: an Employee Relations Commission would have jurisdiction over charges
of unfair practices committed either by the County or by a labor
organization. Upon a finding by this Commission of an unfair practice by an employee organization, "the County would be free to take
such action as it deemed necessary under the circumstances," subject
to authority in the Commission to review any action claimed to be
"immoderately punitive."53 The Report was somewhat ambiguous,
however, on the question whether a Commission order against the
County Board of Supervisors would be legally enforceable.

B. Representation Issues
The reports recognize two basic kinds of representation issues.
The first relates to the issue of exclusivity: Is an employee organization to be recognized as the bargaining agent for union members
alone, or for all employees in a defined "bargaining unit"? The
second issue, which assumes acceptance of the principle of exclusive
representation, concerns the establishment of suitable criteria for
the definition of bargaining units. The Connecticut, Illinois, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania reports followed the model of
the NLRA and subscribed to the principle of exclusive representa•
tion. The exclusivity principle had already been adopted in the
Michigan legislation of 1965,54 and the Michigan Committee did not
advocate a change.
The New York and Los Angeles reports were more cautious on
the issue of exclusivity. Indeed, the Taylor Committee proposed
that the newly established Public Employment Relations Board
"should make the problem of exclusivity ... the focus of continuing
study looking toward recommendations for legislation." 55 In the
50,
51.
52,
53,
54.

Id.
MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. § 423.216 (1967).
See NLRA § 10, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1964).

L.A. Report 30.
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 423.211 (1967).
55. N.Y. Report 30.
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meantime, the matter of exclusivity should be left "to agreement
between the parties and to fact-finding boards." 56 This recommendation was implemented in the 19~7 New York legislation57 which
replaced the Condon-Wadlin Law.
The Los Angeles Report included the following observations:
... We believe that after some stability has been established in
employee representation units and the parties have accumulated
some experience in the conduct of collective relations under the
ordinance, the issue of exclusive representation should be given
careful reconsideration. Exclusive representation tends not only to
enhance administrative efficiency, but also to increase the responsibility as well as the power of the employees' exclusive representative.
An organization having exclusive representation status speaks for
all employees in the appropriate unit; but by the same token, it is
legally bound fairly to represent each employee in that unit, whether
or not he is a member of the organization.
Under present circumstances, however, we do not think it feasible
to provide for exclusive representation rights in the recommended
ordinance.... To grant any organization exclusive representation
at the opening stage of collective relations under the ordinance
would tend to make subsequent unit determinations less flexible
and might give that organization an unfair advantage over others.us

However, the Report recommended that formal recognition be accorded to the organization selected by a majority of the employees in
an appropriate unit. "Status as majority representative would entitle
the organization to negotiate with the management of that unit and
to insist that any agreement reached be embodied in a written instrument signed by both parties." 59 This recommendation might appear
to be somewhat inconsistent with the Commission's previous observations rejecting the notion of exclusive bargaining rights. Apparently,
the answer is that while an organization could be certified to represent a majority of the employees in an "appropriate unit"-thereby
giving it the right to negotiate an agreement applicable unit-wideany other organization representing employees within the unit would
retain a right of "consultation." If this is a correct interpretation of
the proposals, it seems that a "certified" employee organization
would, as a practical matter, acquire exclusive bargaining rights. Any
matter negotiated and incorporated into a written agreement between management and a certified union could hardly be subject to
56. Id.
57. The "Taylor Law," N.Y. Crv. SERv. LAw §§ 200-12 (McKinney Supp. 1968). [The
present version of this law, as amended by a bill passed on March 4, 1969 (effective
April I, 1969), appears in GERR No. 288, at F·l (March 17, 1969).]
58. L.A. Report 21-22.
59. Id. at 23.
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nullification on the basis of separate consultations between management and some other organization representing part of the employees
in the unit.
Because of the peculiarities of public employment labor relations,
determination of the appropriate unit for bargaining may well
present greater difficulties in the public than in the private sector.
For this reason, some of the reports recognized that the large amount
of discretionary authority which the federal statute grants to the
NLRB for bargaining unit determinations60 would not be appropriate in the public sector. These reports recommended that certain
specific standards be incorporated into the governing state statutes in
order to guide the administering agencies in determining appropriate bargaining units. The New York Report in particular stressed
the necessity for a careful appraisal of what is termed "the fragmented vs. the over-all unit for negotiations." 61 The Report stated:
"Criteria for the definition of the term 'appropriate' are required
which square with the characteristics of the public employment
relationship and with the joint responsibility of the employees and
administrators for the effective performance of their mission, namely,
to serve the public." 62 The Report enumerated a number of specific
criteria upon which the determination of the appropriate bargaining
unit should ultimately rest. 63 In essence, the implementing New York
legislation of 1967 incorporated these suggested standards. 64 In observing the work of the state's Public Employment Relations Board,
it will be particularly interesting to note whether it arrives at unit
determinations substantially different from those which would be
expected in the private sector.
60. NLRA § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1964).
61. N.Y. Report 10.
62. Id. at 23.
63. The New York Report suggests that the following factors should be taken into
account in formulating criteria for defining an appropriate bargaining unit:
(1) Consistency of the employee-employer unit with a community of interests
among employees included in the unit.
(a) Community of interests of employees with respect to conditions of employment applying particularly to them.
(b) Community of interest of employees with respect to the continuation
of a traditional, workable, and, on the whole, satisfactory negotiating pattern.
(c) Community of interest of employees with respect to specialization of
occupation according to their craft or profession.
(d) Community of interest of employees with respect to the matter of
exercising their right of representation.
(2) Consistency of the terms of employment, the determination of which lies
within the discretionary authority of the employing agency, with terms concerning which negotiation is sought.
(3) Compatability of the employee-employer unit with the joint duty of administrators and employees to carry out their fundamental mission, i.e., service to
public.
N.Y. Report 23-28.
64. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAw § 207 (McKinney Supp. 1968).
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C. The Scope of Collective Bargaining
The advisory reports generally recognize that the determination
of appropriate subjects for collective bargaining in the public sector
involves problems of the first magnitude. One critical problem is
that public agencies, without some accommodating change in ap•
plicable law, may lack the authority to make binding contractual
commitments relating to certain subjects. For instance, limitations
on discretionary authority are found in civil service legislation,
municipal charter provisions, school codes, and other special legislation. A second question, more of policy than of law, is whether some
subject matters should be entirely excluded from the scope of col•
lective bargaining because of the special responsibility of public
agencies to carry out public service functions. 65 If there is to be a
mandate for collective bargaining in the public sector, to what
extent can or should the legislation take cognizance of these factors?
Alternatively, should the state legislation merely include a broad
duty to bargain, modeled on the NLRA, which would leave legal
questions to be decided by the courts and policy questions to be
decided by the processes of collective bargaining?
The Michigan Act of 1965 followed the NLRA pattern by prescribing a general obligation to bargain collectively on wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment. The Act also contained a proviso similar to those in the NLRA guaranteeing the right
of an individual employee to have his grievance adjusted at any
time. 66
The Taylor Committee recognized that, as in the private sector,
labor organizations in the public sector have broad bargaining aspirations. However, it noted that "the expectations ... concerning what
they can negotiate about are limited by the fact that certain terms of
employment are mandated by legislative enactment." 67 As an example, the Committee referred to employees whose terms of employment are fixed by civil service legislation. The Committee ultimately
concluded that, as a practical matter, the closest that political entities
can come to traditional collective bargaining is "negotiation of terms
on the assumption of the necessity for a joint commitment of the
negotiating parties to the terms, but with the necessity to seek approval and the appropriations to implement any agreement from a
legislative body." 68 The Committee noted that there can be tradi65.
66.
CoMP.
67.
68.

Cf. Exec. Order 10,988. 3 C.F.R. 521 (1959-1963 compilation).
Compare NLRA §§ 8(d), 9(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(d), 159(a) (1964), with
LAws ANN. § 423.211 (1968).
N.Y. Report 57.
Id. at 58.

MICH. ·

March 1969]

Public Employment Reports

905

tional collective bargaining only "if the public through the action
of its legislatures is ready to delegate to a bargaining 'team' composed
of the executives of government agencies and the negotiators for
employee organizations the virtual determination of its budget, the
allocation of public revenues to alternative uses, and the setting of
the tax rate necessary to balance that budget"-a "delegation scarcely
likely to occur in the foreseeable future." 69
The New Jersey Commission tersely recommended "that the scope
of negotiations should be limited by the discretionary or recommending power of the appointing authority in public employment ...." 70 The reference to "recommending power," if written
into law, could leave the range of negotiations very broad indeed. Of
course, if the "discretionary power" of the employing authority is
limited, the results of the bargaining process might not be conclusive.
One possible solution to this problem is to specify that the results
reached in collective bargaining shall prevail over any pre-existing
statutory limitation on the authority of the employing agency. For
example, the draft statute proposed by the Connecticut Commission
included the following provision:
Where there is a conflict between any agreement reached by a
municipal employer and an employee organization and approved
in accordance with the provisions of this Act and any charter, special
act, ordinance, or rules and regulations adopted by the municipal
employer or its agents . . . or any general statute regulating the
hours of work of policemen or firemen, the terms of such agreement
shall prevail.71
The Connecticut body recognized only two qualifications to this
principle: 72 first, collective bargaining should not interfere with civil
service control of merit-rating systems; second, every collective bargaining agreement must be approved by the legislative body with
authority over the employing agency. Under these qualifications, the
legislative body would retain ultimate authority to reject demands
which it considered inconsistent with sound fiscal or other policies.
Despite these limitations, the Connecticut recommendations on the
scope of bargaining represent a position strikingly different from the
far more cautious approach taken by the Taylor Committee.
Most of the advisory groups considered whether the legislature
should pass an explicit statutory requirement wholly reserving certain managerial "prerogatives" as outside the scope of collective bar69. Id. 60-61.

70. GERR No. 229, at D-7.
71. GERR No. 81, at D-9.
72. Id.
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gaining. Following the pattern set by the Goldberg Task Force Report73 at the federal level, most of the groups favored such provisions.
Exceptions are found in the Connecticut and Michigan reports. 74
Public employers represented to the Michigan Advisory Committee
that the 1965 Michigan Act should be amended in order to preserve
certain managerial prerogatives.75 The Michigan Committee, while
cognizant of the potentially serious problems underlying these suggestions, did not consider them of such immediate importance as to
warrant legislative changes without further study.
The Taylor Committee did not deal as explicitly with this matter
as did some of the groups, but its perceptive analysis of the problems,
discussed under the caption "Character of Participating Activity,'' 76
assumed that collective bargaining should not interfere with subject
areas now delegated to various governmental authorities. The Report
also noted that "the issue of 'retained rights' of the employer (related
in public service to the proper performance of both the legislative
and executive functions) is more difficult to deal with in the public
sector than in the private sector." 77 The Illinois Report stated:
It should be the exclusive function of each public employing
agency to determine the mission of the agency, set standards of services to be offered to the public, and exercise control and discretion
over its organization and operations.
It should be the right of each public employing agency to direct
its employees, take disciplinary action, relieve its employees from
duties because of lack of work or for other legitimate reasons, and
determine the methods, means, and personnel by which the agency's
operations are to be conducted. But this should not preclude employees from negotiating or raising grievances about the practical
consequences that decisions on these matters may have on wages,
hours, and working conditions.78

The Pennsylvania Report simply stated that collective bargaining
should be "appropriately qualified by a recognition of existing laws
dealing with aspects of the same subject matter and by a carefully
defined reservation of managerial rights.'' 79
The Los Angeles Report followed a more conservative (or some
would say, more sophisticated) view of the scope of public employee
collective bargaining. It also presented perhaps the most complete
73. See note 1 supra.
74. Connecticut: GERR No. 81, at D-4 (by implication). Michigan: GERR No. 181,
at F-12 (app. F).
75. See GERR No. 181, at F-10 (app. D).
76. N.Y. Report 58.
77. Id. at 17.
78. GERR No. 184, at D-7.
79. GERR No. 281, at E-1 Gan. 27, 1969).
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supporting rationale. Employee organizations, of course, had argued
before the Committee that the "duty to bargain" should be stated in
general terms such as those employed in the NLRA in order to leave
the broadest scope for collective bargaining. County officials maintained that failure clearly to enumerate certain functions and duties
as reserved to various agencies of county government would invite
meaningless and unlawful attempts on the part of employee organizations to widen the legally permissible scope of negotiation. The
Committee stated its position as follows:
On this issue we believe that attempts to draw an exact analogy
with the private sector are misguided and dangerous. The extent to
which private employers have agreed to share traditional managerial
decisions with labor organizations has varied widely between industries and sometimes between enterprises in the same industry.
Concessions on this subject are often merely pragmatic adjustments
to special situations. In the event of bargaining impasses over this
question, private employers and unions can usually resort to the
economic weapons of lockout and strike.
In the public sector, however, the situation is quite different.
Managers of governmental agencies must insure that the functions
intrusted to them are carried out promptly and without interruption. We think they should have the right initially to determine the
manner in which these functions are to be performed. Accordingly,
the provision we recommend explicitly sets forth those rights that
County management may exercise unilaterally and ·without prior
negotiation with employees or their organizations.
At the same time, we recognize that actions taken by management, purportedly "in the public interest," sometimes are unnecessary or arbitrary. We have therefore provided that nothing in the
section on employer rights shall preclude employees from raising
grievances about the practical consequences that decisions on matters reserved for management may have on wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment.80

The Los Angeles Committee then distinguished between the "scope
of consultation" and the scope of "negotiation": those matters explicitly made nonnegotiable by ordinance, but which affect employee
relations, should be subject to "consultation" between employees and
the employing agency. Thus under the proposed ordinance "every
reasonable effort shall be made by management to consult with
employees or their representatives prior to initiating basic changes
in any rule or procedure affecting employee relations."81 Since the
distinction benveen negotiation and consultation will "not always
[be] clearly discernible," the Committee felt that it would be unwise
"to try to draw [such a line] once and for all and for all sub-

so.

L.A. Report 8-9.

81. Id. at 10.
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jects . . . ." 82 Rather, the Committee suggested that "in close and
doubtful cases the [proposed] enforcement commission be empowered
to draw the line on an ad hoc basis." 83 It will be interesting to follow
the experience in Los Angeles County to see whether the somewhat
ambiguous distinction between negotiation and consultation produces results markedly different than those that would be expected
under the NLRA's general definition of the scope of collective bargaining.
Some proposals for an explicit reservation of managerial prerogatives in public employers would constitute, if adopted, a mandate
that collective bargaining agreements in the public sector should
include something approaching-perhaps even more comprehensive
than-the "management rights" provisions frequently negotiated
into private sector contracts. I have some doubt about the feasibility,
or even the desirability, of this kind of attempted restriction on the
scope of public employee collective bargaining. Private sector unions
generally do not quarrel with the position that the ability of a private
firm to determine such matters as the kind and quality of its products
or services is and should remain a managerial prerogative. However,
there are some categories of employees in the public sector who, by
virtue of the nature of their occupations and professional interests,
might claim to have a negotiable concern with the "mission" or goals
of particular public agencies. For example, public school teachers
may reasonably assert that they have a legitimate interest not only
in compensation and "conditions" of employment, but also in the
fundamental educational policies to be followed in a school system.84
Perhaps the same could be said of police and fire fighters. Obviously,
a public agency cannot abdicate all of its public responsibility to
teachers, policemen, or fire fighters, but an obligation to negotiateto share in decision-making-does not necessarily involve abdication.
Indeed, it can be argued that the quality of many public services
would be substantially improved if those most directly involved in,
and dedicated to, the "mission" of the agency had a more direct hand
in the policy-making process.
D. The Strike Issue

I. The Right To Strike
The question whether public employees should be permitted the
right to strike has received unusual emphasis in the various state
82. Id. at 11.
83. Id. at 12.
84. See Klaus, The Evolution of a Collective Bargaining Relationship in Public
Education: New York City's Changing Seven-Year History, 67 MICH. L. REv. 1033,
1042-46 (1969); Wallett, The Coming Revolution in Public School Management, 67
MICH. L. REV. 1017, 1019-21 (1969).
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advisory group reports, not only because of the difficult underlying
policy issues involved, but also because the public seems to be more
genuinely concerned about this matter than with most other issues
raised by public employee unionism. With the single exception of
the Pennsylvania Report, the advisory groups subscribed to the traditional position that employees in the public sector should not be
permitted to strike. Still, as I read the reports, they exhibit varying
levels of philosophic commitment to this policy.
The Taylor Committee left little doubt concerning the extent
of its commitment to the no-strike position. According to its Report,
strikes "in the field of government service" should continue to be
illegal regardless of how essential the particular services involved are
to the community. 85 The argument did not rest on the traditional
theory that public employee strikes constitute an impermissible
interference with the "sovereignty" of the state. 86 Instead, the Committee emphasized certain differences between the functions, constraints, and freedoms applicable to employers in the public and
private sectors. Because of the distinction between "the constraints of
the market place on collective bargaining" in private employment
and "the constraints imposed by democratic political processes" in
public employment, "the strike cannot be a part of the negotiating
process" in the public sector.87 The Illinois Commission also took the
position that work stoppages are not appropriate in the public sector
and should be unequivocally prohibited. 88
The Connecticut, Michigan, and New Jersey committees, although advocating continuance of a no-strike policy, intimated less
conviction about the validity of this approach. Although the Connecticut Commission stated that "the right to strike is an essential
element in any viable system of free collective bargaining," it deferred
to the existing consensus opposed to the right to strike for public
employees.80 The Michigan Committee stated that it did not regard
the "ultimate issue" as settled,00 and the New Jersey Commission
recognized "that both public sentiment and judicial opinion may
alter over time." 91
The Los Angeles Committee, although stating that "public employee strikes are and should be unlawful," 92 elected for undisclosed
85. N.Y. Report 42.
86. For discussions of the doctrine of "sovereignty" in relation to public employee
collective action, see ·w. HART, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE
(1961); C. RHYNE, LABOR UNIONS AND MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEE LAW (1946).
87. N.Y. Report 16.
88. GERR No. 184, at D-11.
89. GERR No. 81, at D-5.
90. GERR No. 181, at F-2.
91. GERR No. 229, at D-6.
92, L.A. Report !II.
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reasons not to justify its position. Thus, according to this advisory
group, to say that strikes are unacceptable "is merely to add a dimension to the problem and does not contribute to its solution." 03
The Los Angeles panel, like most of the others, emphasized the necessity of producing collective bargaining attitudes and dispute settlement procedures (short of compulsory arbitration) that "the parties
will be willing to substitute for trial by economic combat." 94 But the
Committee did not claim that its recommendations directed toward
this objective offered a "fool proof panacea"; 95 indeed, none of the
advisory groups made such a claim.
The Pennsylvania Commission was alone among the advisory
groups in taking the position that "except for policemen and firemen,
a limited right to strike should be recognized," subject to certain
basic safeguards designed to protect the public interest and conditioned upon exhaustion of other procedures.96 The argument for this
startling deviation from the traditional view merits careful examination. The Commission's Report states, in part:
No one should have a right to strike until all collective bargaining procedures have been exhausted....
Likewise there can be no right of public employees to strike if
the health, safety or welfare of the public is endangered. . . .
But where collective bargaining procedures have been exhausted
and public health, safety or welfare is not endangered it is inequitable and unwise to prohibit strikes. The period that a strike can be
permitted will vary from situation to situation. A strike of gardeners
in a public park could be tolerated longer than a strike of garbage
collectors. And a garbage strike might be permissible for a few days
but not indefinitely, and for longer in one community than another,
or in one season than another.
The collective bargaining process will be strengthened if this
qualified right to strike is recognized. It will be some curb on the
possible intransigence of an employer; and the limitations on the
right to strike will serve notice on the employee that there are limits
to the hardships that he can impose.97

2. Sanctions for Violations of the No-Strike Policy
Those advisory groups which recommended adherence to the nostrike policy have taken somewhat different positions on what sanctions should be employed to implement that policy. There was
substantial accord that punitive sanctions directed at individual
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
Id.
Id.
GERR No. 251, at E-1 (July I, 1968).
Id. at E-2 to E-3.
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employees, such as those embodied in New York's now-defunct Condon-Wadlin Law98 or Michigan's former Hutchinson Act,99 are
unworkable in any major strike situation. However, the New York,
Michigan, and Illinois groups did agree that one possible sanction
is a "self-help" approach under which the employing agency could
initiate disciplinary action or discharge proceedings against employees who break the law. 100
A number of reports specifically recommended use of the injunction as a remedial alternative. Here, however, some rather significant
differences in approach become apparent. The Taylor Committee
took the position that in every strike or threatened strike situation,
an injunction should be sought and granted. Indeed, the Committee
proposed that the law officer of the employing agency involved in the
dispute should be empowered automatically to seek an injunction
against illegal strikes and, if the resulting court decree were violated,
"to institute a criminal contempt proceeding. promptly." 101 The New
York Committee also maintained that a public agency which had
sought and obtained injunctive relief should be dissuaded from "negotiating away," through the processes of collective bargaining, either
the injunction itself or the striking organization's potential liability
for contempt. 102 It is implicit in the recommendations of the Taylor
Committee that an equity court should not be limited in the fine or
other penalty which it can assess against an organization or individual
found to be in contempt of an injunction. The Committee proposed
the elimination of the 250-dollars-per-day ceiling on fines which had
been prescribed in section 751 of the New York Judiciary Law.103
However, the legislature did not follow this suggestion; in the Taylor
Law in 1967 it revised the Judiciary Law to prescribe a maximum
fine for individuals of 250 dollars per day and a maximum fine for
employee organizations of the lesser of a week's membership dues or
10,000 dollars per day. Obviously, any such provision, placing an
upper limit on the penalties which can be imposed for contempt of
court, makes it difficult to test fully the theory that the injunctive
remedy can be a means of dealing effectively with strike situations.104
98. Law of March 27, 1947, ch. 391, [1947] N.Y. Laws 842, as amended, Law of April
23, 1963, ch. 702, [1963] N.Y. Laws 2432 (repealed 1967).
99. Law of Oct. 11, 1947, ch. 423, § 208, [1947] Mich. Pub. Acts 336 (for inciting to
strike, imprisonment for not more than one year, fine from $100 to $1,000).
100. N.Y. Report 43-44; GERR No. 181, at F-4 (Michigan); GERR No. 184, at D-12
(Illinois).
101. N.Y. Report 43.
102. Id.
103. See N.Y. Report 43.
104. Contrast the fines imposed in United States v. United Mine Workers of
America, 330 U.S. 258 (1947). The district judge had levied fines of $3,500,000 and
$10,000 against the United Mine Workers Union and John L. Lewis, respectively, for
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Indeed, in recent months the Taylor Committee has again recommended that the limitations on penalties contained in section 751
of the Judiciary Law be removed. In response to this proposal, the
New York legislature amended the Taylor Law on March 4, 1969,
to provide for unlimited fines against striking unions. 105
The Michigan Committee's approach was somewhat different.
The Michigan Act of 1965, although it prohibited strikes by public
employees, specifically recognized only one remedial sanction: disciplinary action or discharge by the public employer.106 The Committee recommended that the legislature amend the statute to make
it clear that the judiciary has authority to enjoin strikes-an issue in
dispute at the time of the Report but since resolved by the courts
themselves. 107 The Committee further recommended that while injunctive relief should be mandatory for any strike threatened or
occurring before the exhaustion of recommended dispute settlement
procedures, 108 the issua~ce of an injunction thereafter should be discretionary with the court. In deciding whether to issue an injunction,
the court would be expressly authorized to consider all the relevant
facts, including a charge that the employing agency had failed to discharge its statutory obligation to bargain in good faith. 109 It is implicit
violation of a restraining order. The Supreme Court sustained the fine against Lewis
and $700,000 of the fine against the Union as appropriate penalties for criminal contempt of the lower court's order. The balance of the fine against the Union was
abated subject to union action to purge itself of contempt. I do not suggest that fines
of this magnitude, or that an unlimited discretion in the matter of fines, should
necessarily be used. Moreover, I am fully cognizant of the fact that even a large fine
can have a minimal adverse impact on a large union if, as is probable, the union
possesses the power to levy a special assessment on its members to cover the fine.
105. The amended Taylor Law also provides for the loss of dues check-off privileges
for unlimited periods and the loss of two day's pay for each day an employee is on
strike. Moreover, a striking worker is subject to one year's probation with loss of tenure
for any violation of the strike prohibition. GERR No. 288, at F-6 to F-7.
106. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.206 (1967).
107. In School Dist. v. Holland Educ. Assn., 380 Mich. 314, 157 N.W.2d 206 (1968),
the Supreme Court of Michigan ruled that Michigan courts have the jurisdiction to
restrain strikes by public employees.
108. I recognize that there may be a legal question whether or not a state legislature may constitutionally compel an equity court to issue an injunction, without
regard to any question other than the existence or nonexistence of a strike, without
inquiry into the "equities" of the case.
109. The effect of this recommendation is ~·~ recognize the equitable "clean bands"
doctrine in cases of strikes by public employees. The decision of the Michigan Supreme
Court in Holland (see note 107 supra) appears to be consistent with this recommendation. In the Holland case, the Court dissolved the temporary injunction granted in a
teachers' strike and remanded the case, with the suggestion that the lower court inquire
into whether the plaintiff School District bad refused to bargain in good faith. !180
Mich. at 327, 157 N.W.2d at 211. The American Bar Association's Section on Labor
Relations Law construed this recommendation of the Michigan co1. mittce to mean
that strikes should be permitted "under limited circumstances." Report of the Committee on the Law of Government Employee Relations, presented at the 1967 Annual
Meeting of the American Bar Association and reprinted in the Labor Relations Law
Section program for that meeting.
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in the Michigan Report that an equity court should not be limited in
its discretionary power to impose fines or other penalties for violations of injunctions.
The Illinois Commission, like the Taylor Committee, took the
view that an injunction should be sought in all cases of illegal strikes.
Unlike the Taylor Committee, however, the Illinois Commission
would vest responsibility for initiating court action in the employing
agency itself rather than in its principal legal officer.11° As a result,
the legal officer could not seek an injunction automatically until authorized to do so by his superiors. The Illinois Commission, also
unlike the Taylor Committee, did not indicate what penalties a court
should apply in a contempt proceeding against employees or a labor
organization for violating an injunction. The panel simply stated
that the statute should "affirm the existing power of the courts
to enjoin strikes and should make clear that its provisions are not designed to limit any inherent judicial power." 111 This recommendation
seems to recognize that injunctive relief-traditionally an extraordinary legal remedy granted only after judicial balancing of the
conflicting interests of the parties-should not be granted simply on
a showing by the employing agency that a strike is imminent or has
occurred.112 The recommendation also recognizes that an equity court
should retain its traditional discretion in the matter of fines.
The Pennsylvania Commission, while proposing that strikes be
legalized under strict safeguards designed to protect the public interest, also recommended that "severe penalties" should be imposed
for violation of an injunction against a strike declared illegal by judicial decree. These penalties, declared the Commission, should "take
the form of fines or imprisonment or both against strikers or the
organizations responsible for strikes." 113
The Connecticut, New Jersey, and Los Angeles advisory groups
elected to deal with the strike issue only in terms of principle, without
prescribing specific sanctions. The Connecticut Report's proposed
statutory provision merely stated: "Nothing in this Act shall constitute a grant of the right to strike to employees of any municipal employer and such strikes are hereby expressly prohibited."114 The
proposed Los Angeles County ordinance, as noted above, did not
U0. GERR No. 184, at D-12.
111. Id.
112. Cf. School Dist. v. Holland Educ. Assn., 280 Mich. 314, 325-27, 157 N.W.2d
206, 210 (1968).
113. GERR No. 251, at E-3.
114. GERR No. 81, at D-10.
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contain any provision dealing with strikes. The Los Angeles Committee expressed its judgment regarding sanctions as follows:
In our judgment it is far preferable to specify no penalties in the
ordinance, thereby preserving for the Commission or County, as the
case may be, complete freedom to act in whatever way deemed necessary to deal with a particular situation. Thus, it could take various
administrative actions against the offending organization and employees, such as cancellation of checkoff or dismissal, or seek an appropriate remedy in the courts, such as an injunction. Uncertainty as
to what the County might do under these circumstances would in
itself constitute a possible deterrent against strikes and stoppages.110

The Committee emphasized, however, that it was not recommending
the imposition of increasingly severe sanctions as a solution to the
problem of public employee strikes.116
A possible sanction against illegal strike action, applied at the
federal level under Executive Order 10,988,117 is the denial of recognition to a public sector union or other employee organization which
asserts the right to strike or engages in strike action. The Taylor
Committee recommended this as an additional sanction which could
be imposed in the discretion of the proposed Public Employment
Relations Board. Such discretion would enable the Board to weigh
"the equities" of a given situation, including the merits of any charge
that the employing agency engaged in such "acts of extreme provocation as to detract from the fault of the employee organization or
its officers in permitting the strike to take place." 118 However, the
New York legislature in its 1967 enactment rejected this recommendation of the Taylor Committee: it authorized the cancellation of the
"check-off" for a period not to exceed eighteen months, but did not
authorize cancellation of recognition rights.119 Withdrawal of recognition was considered, but rejected, by the Illinois and Michigan
committees, and, implicitly, by the Connecticut, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania advisory groups. It is not altogether clear whether the
Los Angeles Committee included cancellation of recognition among
the kinds of "administrative actions" which an employing agency
could take against a striking organization.
ll5. L.A. Report 33-34.
ll6. Id. at 34.
117. 3 C.F.R. 521 (1959-1963 compilation).
118. N.Y. Report 44.
119. N.Y. CIV. SERV. LAW § 210(£) (McKinney Supp. 1968). The amendment of March
4, 1969, however, provides for the loss of dues check-off privileges for unlimited periods.
GERR No. 288, at F-7.
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3. The Definition of a Strike
One additional problem with "the strike issue" is definitional:
Should a general strike prohibition be construed to include a variety
of concerted actions which, although something less than a formal
strike, are undertaken to advance collective bargaining aims? Such
concerted actions might include mass resignations, calling in sick
(sometimes referred to as "blue flu" in police situations), on-the-job
"slowdowns," and, in the case of public school teachers, concerted
refusals to sign individual contracts. The Connecticut Report and
proposed draft statute made no effort to define a "strike." The New
York, Minnesota, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Los Angeles groups did not deal with the problem explicitly. The advisory
body in Illinois, going further, recommended that "the definition
of a strike should be broad enough to include such concerted stoppages as mass resignations and the mass calling-in-sick, designed to
place pressure on the governmental agency." 120 Apart from what the
committees have said, the courts will probably have little difficulty
interpreting general legislation prohibiting public employee strikes
to include these other forms of concerted action short of total work
stoppage. The more difficult question is whether the sanctions imposed by courts or other tribunals can effectively control this kind of
economic pressure.121

E. Procedures for the Settlement of Contract Disputes
All the reports stressed the necessity of evolving dispute settlement procedures which would reduce the need to resort to strike
action. The Taylor Committee emphasized that public employer
agencies and employee organizations must give serious attention to
developing improved bargaining skills and bargaining patterns responsive to budgetary timetables and other constraints in order to
cope with the unique problems of collective bargaining in the public
120. GERR No. 184, at D-12.
121. Obviously, the courts will face practical difficulties-including problems of
proof-in attempting to supervise employee conduct in the case of alleged "slow-downs,"
sick-call-ins, and mass resignations. A difficult legal question is whether this type of
employee action, though done concertedly for the purpose of forcing an improvement
in working conditions, can lawfully be enjoined in view of the constitutional right of
an individual to terminate his employment. It would seem that any court decree
would have to recognize the right of an individual, disassociated from any group
decision, to quit his employment. The situation of the school teacher, who may be
required by state law to sign an individual employment contract, also presents its
unique legal and practical problems. For example, may a court appropriately order a
teacher to sign an individual employment contract before collective bargaining negotiations between the teachers' association and the school board have been completed
and an agreement reached?
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sector.122 This suggestion was based on the premise that skillful, goodfaith, realistic negotiations will be more likely to produce settlements
than the crude and untutored forms of collective bargaining which
have all too often characterized the initial stages of collective bargaining in the public sector.
The advisory reports differed somewhat in their specific recommendations concerning the design and implementation of appropriate dispute resolution procedures. For instance, there was no
agreement on how fact-finding should be carried out. Should designated fact :finders simply conduct appropriate hearings and make
:findings of fact, or should they also be empowered to conduct
mediation? There have been various suggestions concerning the
extent to which fact-finding recommendations should be publicized
and public attention focused on the party deemed to be at fault on
particular bargaining issues. The Michigan Committee recommended that the parties to a dispute be required to resort to specific
statutory procedures-negotiation, mediation, and fact-findingaccording to a definite timetable necessitated by the budgetary and
other constraints upon the particular public agency.123 These are
areas in which there is room for differences of opinion and further
experimentation. Experience with a variety of procedures should
provide a better empirical basis for judgments concerning their
efficacy.
One impasse resolution alternative which may attract increasing
support in coming years is the use of compulsory third-party arbitration of disputes over contract terms. The advisory groups, with the
exception of the Rhode Island and Michigan committees, rejected
this approach. The Michigan Committee suggested that compulsory
arbitration be tried, experimentally, for a limited period in the
case of policemen and fire :fighters.124 Implementation of this approach on a wider basis would be difficult without substantial public
support as well as the support of the employing agencies and the
employee organizations directly concerned, and the latter may not
be quickly forthcoming. Moreover, the use of compulsory arbitration
raises some fundamental problems of governmental structure: it
entails a delegation of authority to third parties to make decisions
which the public has traditionally entrusted to its elected or appointed representatives. It may be that some of these problems can
be ameliorated by the enactment of specific guidelines or standards
for decision which will operate as constraints upon third-party de122. N.Y. Report 33.
123. GERR No. 181, at F-2 to F-3.
124. Id. at F-3.
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terminations. The dimensions of the problems are considerable,
however, and cannot be treated adequately here.
The fundamental problem in public sector labor relations, as we
have seen, is the assumed inconsistency between the grant of a right
to bargain collectively and the attempt to prohibit strike action as a
means of supporting bargaining demands. The increasing incidence
of public employee strikes despite their illegality suggests that the
dilemma may be beyond resolution. If this is in fact the case, the
preferable course-suggested by the Pennsylvania Committee125 and
a few other observers-may be to affirm the right of public employees
to strike subject to conditions designed to safeguard the public
interest. After all, it appears that the adamant refusal in this country
to permit strikes in the public sector is a phenomenon by no means
universally shared in other countries. In this regard, the experience
of foreign nations with other points of view on the strike issue might
profitably be explored. 126 At the same time, there is some evidence in
this country that alternative dispute resolution procedures, including mediation and fact-finding, have been sufficient to induce settlements in most situations.127 It may be that these procedures, coupled
with the development of improved bargaining skills and an increased
recognition by the parties that the public will not tolerate prolonged
strikes with an adverse effect upon essential services, will enable
most collective bargaining issues to be resolved in the negotiating
process short of disruptive strikes. Still, I very much doubt that
public sector strikes will wholly disappear. My guess is that their
incidence will rise as the areas of organization and collective bargaining in the public sector expand. If this prognostication is accurate, there will be further support for the thesis that strikes cannot
really be prevented. Unless we accord public employees at least a
limited right to strike, we will be in danger-and perhaps already are
-of according a kind of de facto recognition to conduct officially
declared illegal. This state of affairs is scarcely desirable in any
society which purports to order its human relations according to the
processes of law.
IV. CONCLUSION
Obviously, this survey of the reports and recommendations of
public employment advisory groups has not purported to take ac125. Pennsylvania Report 5, 12-14.
126. See generally Schmidt, General Report (II B) to the Sixth Intl. Cong. of Labour
Law and Social Legislation, Stockholm, Aug. 15-17, 1966.
127. See J. BELASCO, PUBLIC EMPLOYEE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT (1966); Stern, Wisconsin
Fact-Finding Procedure, 20 INDUS. &: LAB. REL. REv. 1 (1966); Howlett, Michigan's
Experience with Public Employee Bargaining, in GERR, No. 206, at E-1 (Aug. 21,
1967).

918

Michigan Law Review

count of numerous unofficial contributions independently made by
various persons interested in public sector unionism-academicians,
government personnel, labor leaders, journalists, and others.128 This
Symposium, indeed, contains a number of such contributions. A
comparison of their views with those of the officially constituted
advisory groups will reveal that the advisory group reports are not a
repository of all there is to be said about public sector unionism.
The peculiar virtue of advisory group efforts lies in the opportunity presented for responsible, consultative deliberation. Indeed,
I would reaffirm the merit of the recommendation contained in several of the reports that state public employment relations legislation
should establish in each state a permanent advisory commission.
These bodies should have the responsibility to examine and report to
the governor and the legislature developments in public employment
labor relations; they would thus ensure continuous objective appraisal of existing policy in the field with a view toward possible
modifications. Pressures on legislative bodies by "management,"
"labor," and other interested groups to adopt some particular policy
in the area of public sector unionism will inevitably increase. As this
occurs, the need for help in determining the appropriate policy will
increase correspondingly because the problems are difficult, the issues
are serious, and the public interest is deeply involved.
128. See generally M. MosKow, TEACHERS AND UNIONS (1966); Morris, Public Policy
and the Law Relating to Collective Bargaining in the Public Service, 22 Sw. L.J. 585
(1968); Newland, Collective Bargaining Concepts: Application in Governments, 28 PUB.
ADM. R.Ev. 141 (1968); McKelvey, The Role of State Agencies in Public Employee Labor
Relations, 20 INDUS. &: LAB. REL. R.Ev. 179 (1967); Stieber, Collective Bargaining in
the Public Sector, in THE AMERICAN AssEMBLY, CHALLENGES TO COLLECTIVE BARGAINING,
ch. 3 (1967).

